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A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO DEFENDING "NATURAL"
FOOD LABELING LITIGATION
Lauren E. Handel
I. INTRODUCTION
O ne of the most active areas of class action litigation involvesconsumer class actions based on allegedly deceptive labeling and
advertising of food products.' Hundreds of such cases have been filed,2 and
new cases are being filed all the time. Most of the cases claim that
manufacturers falsely and misleadingly labeled their products as "natural"
despite allegedly containing artificial or highly processed ingredients or
ingredients derived from genetically modified organisms ("GMOs").
Plaintiffs filed at least 100 such "natural" labeling cases between 2011 and
2013.
The litigation appears to have impacted industry. For example, in
response to threatened lawsuits from the Center for Science in the Public
Interest ("CSPI"), Cadburry-Schweppes dropped the "natural" label from
its 7UP beverages.' Likewise, Kraft dropped the "natural" claim from its
Capri Sun drinks and Nestle agreed to remove such claims from
Edy's/Dreyer's ice creams after CSPI filed suit.s Additionally, because of
several lawsuits, Snapple no longer uses the "natural" claim on products
containing high fructose corn syrup.' Perhaps because of the litigation risk,
* Partner, Foscolo & Handel PLLC; B.A. 1997, University of Maryland, College Park; J.D.
2002, cum laude, Georgetown University Law Center; LL.M. 2013, University of Arkansas School of
Law in in Agricultural and Food Law.
1 See Stephanie Strom, After Tobacco, Lawyers Set Their Sights on Food Industry, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
19, 2012, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/19/business/lawyers-of-big-tobacco-
lawsuits-take-aim-at-food-industry.htmnl?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
2 Rebecca Cross, BraunHagey & Borden LLP, Webinar, Regulatory Update: Are natural claims
worth the legal headaches? (June 26, 2013), at http://www.dairyreporter.com/smartlead/view
/7 9 5 74 2/4/Regulatory-update-Are-natural-daims-worth-the-legal-headaches?do=submit.
3 Mike Esterl, Some Food Companies Ditch Natural' Label, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 6, 2013, 12:07
AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304470504579163933732367084.
4 7UP Drops "All Natural Claim", CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST (Jan 12, 2007),
http://cspinet.org/new/200701121.html.
s Litigation Project - Closed Cases, CTR. FOR SC. IN THE PUB. INTEREST,
http://www.cspinet.org/litigation/closed.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2014).
6 See Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742, 2011 WL 196930, at *1 (S.D.N.Y
Aug. 5,2010).
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the percentage of new food products introduced in the US making "natural"
claims decreased from thirty-three percent in 2007 to twenty-two percent
as of July 2014.' Increasingly, manufacturers are replacing "natural" labels
with "simple," "wholesome," "pure," "fresh," or "minimally processed"
labels.
As "natural" labeling litigation is relatively new and no cases have yet
gone to trial, it is unknown whether this type of litigation ultimately will
prove fruitfiul for plaintiffs. However, given that new cases continue to be
filed and that plaintiffs have obtained multi-million dollar settlements,' it
appears that the wave of "natural" claims litigation will not quickly come to
an end. Therefore, food manufacturers and their attorneys are well advised
to understand the regulatory background, claims, and defenses at issue in
"natural" labeling cases.
This article addresses those issues. It is intended to be a resource for
defense lawyers and food businesses to help prepare for possible "natural"
labeling lawsuits and to minimize the risk of such litigation.
II. BACKGROUND
Consumer beliefs about natural foods combined with vague and lax
regulation of "natural" claims have created perfect conditions for litigation.
A. Consumer (Mis)understanding of "Natural" Claims
"Natural" claims provide an attractive target for plaintiffs' lawyers
because consumers increasingly want to buy natural foods, but have little
understanding of what the term "natural" means. In 2004, the National
Marketing Institute reported that sixty-three percent of consumers have a
preference for natural foods and beverages.' Other surveys have shown that
' Tom Vierhile, Webinar, The Natural and Clean Label Market Opportunity (June 26, 2013),
http://www.dairyreporter.com/smartlead/view/795736/4/The-natural-and-dean-label-market-
opportunity-, Maggie Hennessy, Slowdown in Natural Claims 'Inevitable' Say Market Researchers,
FOODNAVIGATOR-USA.coM (Aug. 20, 2014 4:39 PM), http://www.foodnavigator-
usa.com/Markets/Mintel-Datamonitor-Slowdown-in-natural-daims-inevitable.
Eterl, supra note 3.
Letter from Andrew C. Briscoe III, President & CEO, Sugar Ass'n, to Division of Dockets
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more consumers prefer products labeled "natural" to products labeled
"organic." In one poll conducted in 2009, fifty percent of respondents "said
the 'natural' label was either important or very important to them," while
only thirty-five percent felt that way about the "organic" label. 0 Another
study conducted in 2009 found that "31 percent of consumers surveyed
believed '100% natural' is the most desirable eco-friendly label claim, while
only 14 percent selected '100% organic.'"" But even though consumers
apparently prefer the "natural" label, they are likely to believe (incorrectly)
that the term is largely synonymous with "orgaiic." According to a 2010
study by Hartman Group, consumers largely associate both "organic" and
"natural" with the "absence of pesticides, herbicides, growth hormones,
antibiotics, and GMOs."12 Yet, all of those things may be used in products
labeled "natural."
B. Climate of Lax Regulatory Enforcement
Though evidence suggests that consumers are likely to be confused by
food label claims, the government has done little to crack down on
misleading labels. In a September 2009 speech to the National Food Policy
Conference, Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") Commissioner
Margaret Hamburg acknowledged that "[t]he public health importance of
food labeling as an essential means for informing consumers about proper
nutrition . . . has not been substantially addressed since the FDA
implemented the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, more than 16
years ago."" On March 3, 2010, Commissioner Hamburg issued an "Open
Letter to Industry,"14 announcing a new agency emphasis on food labeling
Management, FDA, at 3-4 (Feb. 28, 2006) (Docket No. FDA-2006-P-0206-0002), available at
http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/sugarfdaL-petition.pdf (citing E. A. Sloan, Gourmet & Specialty Food
Trends, 58 FOOD TECH. 7, 26-38 (July 2004)).
'o CHARLOTTE VALLAEYS ET AL., CORNUCOPIA INST., CEREAL CRIMES: How "NATURAL"
CLAIMS DECEIVE CONSUMERS AND UNDERMINE THE ORGANIC LABEL-A LOOK DowN THE
CEREAL AND GRANOLA AISLE 10 (Oct. 2011), available at http://cornucopia.org/cereal-
scorecard/docs/CornucopiaCereaLReport.pdf.
11Id
12Id
13 Dr. Margaret A. Hamburg, Comm'r of FDA, Keynote Address at National Food Policy
Conference (Sept. 8, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucml82061.htm.
" Open Letter from Margaret A. Hamburg, Comm'r of FDA, to food indus. (March 3, 2010),
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claims, including a front-of-pack labeling initiative and a call to
manufacturers to improve .compliance with labeling rules.'s At about the
same time, the FDA issued seventeen warning letters regarding misbranded
foods.16 Despite these efforts, in January 2011, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office issued a report finding that the "FDA may not be
doing all it can to help ensure that food labels are free from false or
misleading claims." 7
Under Commissioner Hamburg, the FDA has increased enforcement
against misbranded foods, yet it has not done much specifically with regard
to "natural" claims. In the ten years before 2011, the FDA issued only five
warning letters asserting that labels containing "natural" claims were
misbranded." In 2011 alone, the FDA issued four such letters, which may
partially explain the significant increase in lawsuits over "natural" claims
filed that year.' 9 Yet this enforcement trend did not continue in subsequent
years. Since 2011, the FDA has taken only three actions regarding "natural"
claims. In 2012, it issued an import alert regarding an Israeli berry juice
product containing sulfur dioxide as a preservative, which the FDA said was
misbranded as "natural."20 In 2013, the FDA issued a warning letter to
Waterwheel Premium Foods Pty Limited finding that the company's
crackers, which contained artificial rye flavor, were misbranded because they
were labeled as "All Natural."2 ' And in 2014, the FDA issued a warning
letter to Middle East Bakery, LLC, citing the company for improperly
available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/LabeingNutrition
/ucm202733.htm.
1s See Front-of-Package Labeling Initiative, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/LabelingNutrition/ucm202726.htm (last
updated May, 17, 2013).
16 U.S. GovT ACCOUNTABILYTY OFFICE, GAO-11-102, FOOD LABELING: FDA NEEDS TO
REASSESS ITS APPROACH TO PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM FALSE OR MISLEADING CLAIMS 14
(2011).
1d. at 27.
sSee Nicole E. Negowetti, A National Watural" Standardfor Food Labeling, 65 ME. L. REV. 581,
588-89 (2013); Nathan A. Beaver, "Natural" Claims: The Current Legal and Regulatory Landscape,
Aspatore, 2012 WL 4971935, at *6 (2012).
19 Beaver, supra note 18, at *6.
20 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., IMPORT ALERT 99-20 (Apr. 3, 2012),
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cms-ia/importalert_264.html.
21 Warning Letter from Roberta F. Wagner, Dir. Office Compliance, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.
to John Stanger, Technical Manager, Waterwheel Premium Foods Pty Ltd. (July 26, 2013),
http://www.fda.gov/iceci/enforcementactions/warningletters/2013/ucm364729.htm.
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claiming its blueberry pancakes were "All Natural" when they contained
sodium acid pyrophosphate, a synthetic substance.2 2
C. The Regulatory Framework Governing "Natural" Claims
The absence of dear regulatory standards for the use of "natural"
labels is another significant factor that has spurred litigation. Apart from
the general requirement not to misbrand foods, there is no binding legal
standard for the use of the term "natural" in food labeling.23
1. Misbranding
Under the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), food in
interstate commerce may not be labeled in any way that is "false or
misleading."24 Likewise, the Federal Meat Inspection Act ("FMIA") and
the Poultry Products Inspection Act ("PPIA") prohibit the misbranding of
a Warning Letter from Mutahar S. Shamsi, Dist. Dir., U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to Leopoldo
Guggenheim, President and Co-owner, Middle East Bakery, LLC (Sept. 18, 2014),
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2014/ucm415564.htm.
3 As discussed in Section II.C.2.a. infra, there is no federal statute or regulation regarding the
use of the term "natural" to describe foods or ingredients other than "natural flavors." Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and Vermont are the only states with laws on the use of "natural" in general food
labeling. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-92 (2014) ("Natural food" means food (A) which has not
been treated with preservatives, antibiotics, synthetic additives, artificial flavoring or artificial coloring
and (B) which has not been processed in a manner that makes such food significantly less nutritive.
Processing of food by extracting, purifying, heating, fermenting, concentrating, dehydrating, cooling or
freezing shall not, of itself prevent the designation of such food as "natural food.") amended by 2013
Conn. Acts 13-183 (Reg. Sess.) (to add "which has not been genetically engineered"); 105 MASS. CODE
REGs. 520.116 (2014) ("'Natural food' means food which in its processing has not been treated with
preservatives, antibiotics, synthetic additives, artificial flavoring, artificial coloring, or has been processed
in such a manner so that it become significantly less nutritive. Natural foods may only be processed by
extracting, purifying, heating, fermenting, concentrating, dehydrating, cooling, or freezing."); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, § 3043(c) (2014) (prohibiting "natural" labeling of foods made with genetic engineering).
Several states regulate the use of the term "natural" with regard to bottled water. E.g., GA. CoMP. R. &
REGS. 40-7-6-.01 (1996) ("'Natural Water' means bottled spring, mineral, artesian, or well water which
is derived from an underground formation, which is not altered, and is not derived from a municipal
system or public water supply."); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 111190 (West 2014); D.C.
MUN. REGS. tit. 25-B, § 1004 (2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 500.11 (West 2014); HAw. REV. STAT. §
328D-1 (2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:737 (2013); 10-144-235 ME. CODE R. § 2 (LexisNexis
2014); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 21-336 (West 2014); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 19, §
20-1.050(2)(C)3.(E) (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 913.24 (West 2014); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE §
310:225-1-2 (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 61-32 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.07.180
(West 2014); 010-004 WYO. CODE R. § 8 (LexisNexis 2014).
2 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2012) (prohibiting misbranded food); 21 U.S.C. § 343(a) (2012) (defining
misbranded").
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meat and poultry products, respectively.25 Under the FMIA and the PPIA,
the US Department of Agriculture's ("USDA") Food Safety Inspection
Service ("FSIS") has primary authority for regulating labeling of meat and
poultry products,26 which are products containing more than three percent
raw meat, at least two percent cooked meat or poultry, or at least ten
percent cooked poultry skins, giblets or fat.27 All other food products fall
within the jurisdiction of the FDA pursuant to its authority under the
FDCA.28 The FSIS must preapprove labels for meat and poultry to ensure
that they are not false or misleading and that they comply with other
requirements before the products may enter commerce. 29 The FDA does
not preapprove labels for foods within its jurisdiction. But it may take
enforcement action against producers or others responsible for misbranded
foods by issuing warning letters, ordering administrative detention,"o or
referring cases to the US Department of Justice to bring civil actions in
federal court for seizure 1 or injunction.32
2. FDA And USDA Policies on "Natural" Claims
The FDCA, FMIA, and PPIA do not define or set limits on the use
of the term "natural" to describe foods or ingredients. Nor has the FDA or
the USDA issued any regulation defining "natural" for purposes of food
labeling, except to the extent that they distinguish between natural and
2521 U.S.C. § 458(a)(2) (2012) (poultry); 21 U.S.C. § 610(d) (2012) (meat).
26 21 U.S.C. §§ 451, 607 (2012). .
27 9 C.F.R. § 381.15(a) (2012) (poultry); U. S. DEP'T. OF AGRIC., FOOD SAFETY &
INSPECTION SERV., FOOD STANDARDS AND LABELING POLICY BOOK 10 (2005).
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/larc/Policies/LabeingPolicyBookO82005.pdf (discussing
"amenability").
28 See 21 U.S.C. § 341 (2012).
29 The FMIA and PPIA both provide that no food article "shall be sold or offered for sale by any
person in commerce, under any name or other marking or labeling . .. but established trade names and
other marking and labeling and containers which are not false or misleading and which are approved by
the Secretary." 21 U.S.C. § 457(c) (2012) (PPIA); see 21 U.S.C. § 607(d) (2012) (substantially similar
language in FMIA); see also Labeling Approval, 9 C.F.R. § 317.4(a) (2014); False or Misleading
Labeling Practices Generally, 9 C.F.R. § 317.8(a) (2014).
so 21 U.S.C. § 334(h)(1)(A) (2012).
31 21 U.S.C. § 334 (2012).
32 21 U.S.C. § 332 (2012).
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artificial flavors and coloring.3 3 Both agencies, however, have informal
policies on the use of the term "natural" in food labeling.
(a) FDA
FDA policy defines "natural" as "meaning that nothing artificial or
synthetic (including all color additives regardless of source) has been
included in, or has been added to, a food that would not normally be
expected to be in the food."34 The FDA considers its "policy" to be an
advisory opinion3 5 and will not "recommend legal action against a person or
product" that complies with its policy.3 1 Yet, the policy does not establish
legal requirements regarding the use of "natural" claims.3 7
The FDA has repeatedly declined to formally define "natural." In
1991, the FDA requested comments on whether it should define "natural"
for purposes of food labeling and how it might do that." After receiving
thousands of comments, the agency decided that, due to resource
constraints and competing priorities, it would not undertake the rulemaking
necessary to define "natural."3 ' Then, in February 2006, the Sugar
Association petitioned the FDA to establish regulations governing the use
of "natural" for food and beverages and, specifically, to adopt the USDA's
33 'Natural flavor or "natural flavoring" are defined in federal regulations as "the essential oil,
oleoresin, essence or extractive, protein hydrolysate, distillate, or any product of roasting, heating or
enzymolysis, which contains the flavoring constituents derived from a spice, fruit or fruit juice, vegetable
or vegetable juice, edible yeast, herb, bark, bud, root, leaf or similar plant material, meat, seafood,
poultry, eggs, dairy products, or fermentation products thereof, whose significant function in food is
flavoring rather than nutritional." 21 C.F.R. § 101.22(a)(3) (2014) (FDA definition); see also 9 C.F.R. §
317.2(f)(1)(i)(B) (2014) (USDA definition of same). "Natural color" or "natural coloring" is not
"artificial coloring," as defined in 21 C.F.R. § 101.22(a)(4) (2014) (referencing definition of "color
additive" in 21 C.F.R. § 70.3(f) (2014)).
' Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Definition of Terms;
Definitions of Nutrient Content Claims for the Fat, Fatty Acid, and Cholesterol Content of Food, 58
Fed. Reg. 2302, 2407 (Jan. 6,1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 5, 101).
35 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(e) (2014).
36 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(d) (2014).
3 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(j) (2014).
" Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Definition of Terms,
56 Fed. Reg. 60,421, 60,466 (Nov. 27, 1991) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 5, 101, 105).
3 Food Labeling- Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Definition of Terms;
Definitions of Nutrient Content Claims for the Fat, Fatty Acid, and Cholesterol Content of Food ,58
Fed. Reg. at 2302, 2407.
2014-2015] 261
262 KY.J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L. [Vol.7 No.2
informal definition (discussed below).4 The petition remains pending, and
the FDA has taken no official action on it. More recently, several courts
have stayed "natural" labeling cases and asked the FDA to decide the
meaning of "natural."41 The FDA has not accepted the invitation. Instead,
it has responded that such a determination would require rulemaking that
the agency cannot undertake due to resource constraints and higher
priorities. 4 2
The FDA has not provided guidance on whether "natural" labeling is
appropriate for foods produced by genetic engineering. It has determined
that foods produced through genetic engineering are safe and effectively no
different than their traditional counterparts.43 Accordingly, in guidance to
the food industry, the FDA has taken the position that the use of genetic
engineering in the production of food is not material information that must
be disclosed in products' labeling." Yet, the FDA's guidance says nothing
about whether it would be misleading to label foods produced with GMOs
as "natural."
" This petition was joined by Center for Science in the Public Interest. Letter from Stephen
Gardner, Dir. of Lit., Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, to Division of Dockets Management, FDA,
(Mar. 12, 2006) (Docket No. FDA-2006-P-0206-0007), available at http://www.cspinet.org
/new/pdflfda -natural.pdf.
41 See discussion of primary jurisdiction defense infra Part IV(D); see also In re Gen. Mills, Inc.
Kix Cereal Lit., No. 12-249 (KM), 2013 WL 5943972, at *1-2 (D.NJ. Nov. 1, 2013); Barnes v.
Campbell Soup Co., No. C 12-05185 JSW, 2013 WL 5530017, at * 9 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2013); Cox v.
Gruma Corp., No. 12-CV-6502 YGR, 2013 WL 3828800, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2013); Coyle v.
Hornell Brewing Co., No. 08-2797 (JBS), 2010 WL 2539386, at *1 (D.N.J. June 15, 2011); Holk v.
Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07-3018 (MLC), 2010 WL 4065390, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 15, 2010); Ries v.
Hornell Brewing Co., Inc., No. 10-1139-JF (PVT), 2010 WL 2943860, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 23,
2010).
42 See Letter from Leslie Kux, Assistant Comm'r for Policy, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Serv., to Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, et al. (Jan. 6, 2014), available at
http://www.hpm.com/pdf/blog/FDA%2Lrt%201-2014%20re%2ONamral.pdf; Letter from Michael
M. Landa, Acting Dir., Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, to Hon. Jerome B. Simandle,
U.S. Dist. Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of NJ. (Sept. 16, 2010), available at
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-jersey/njdce/1:2008cv02797/215633/119/.
" See Draft Guidance for Industry- Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have
Not Been Developed Using Bioengineering, Availability, 66 Fed. Reg. 4,839, 4,839 (Jan. 18, 2001)
(announcing availability of Draft Guidance and restating a 1992 policy that the FDA "ha[s] no basis for
concluding that bioengineered foods differ from other foods in any meaningful or uniform way, or that,
as a class, food developed by the new techniques present any different or greater safety concern than
foods developed by traditional plant breeding" (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984) (May 29, 1992)).
4 Id. at 4,840.
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(b) USDA
The USDA's policy on "natural" claims is more detailed than the
FDA's. The FSIS permits the term "natural" to be used in meat and poultry
product labeling if:
(1) The product does not contain any artificial flavor or flavoring,
coloring ingredient, or chemical preservative (as defined in 21
CFR 101.22), or any other artificial or synthetic ingredient; and
(2) the product and its ingredients are not more than minimally
processed.45
Minimal processing includes (1) traditional processes used to make
food edible, preserve it, or make it safe,. such as smoking, freezing, and
drying; or (2) physical processes that do not fundamentally alter the raw
product or that only separate a whole food into component parts, such as,
grinding meat.46 When a "natural" claim is made on a USDA-regulated
label, it must be linked to a brief statement explaining its meaning-e.g., "no
more than minimally processed and contains no artificial ingredients.""
The FSIS may grant exceptions to this general policy on a case-by-case
basis and approve a "natural" claim for a product with an ingredient that has
been more than minimally processed if both of the following conditions are
met: (1) the use of such ingredient would not significantly change the
character of the product to the point that it could no longer be considered a
natural product; and (2) the natural claim is qualified to identify the
ingredient-e.g., "all natural or all natural ingredients except dextrose,
modified food starch, etc."48 Ingredients having a preservative effect,
including sodium lactate, potassium lactate, and calcium lactate, are not
considered "natural," even if not more than minimally processed.49
Like the FDA, the USDA has repeatedly declined to formalize its
definition of "natural." USDA's policy dates back to its November 22, 1982,
4s U.S. DEPT OF AGRIC., supra note 27, at 116.
4 Id.
47 d
49 Id.
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Policy Memo 055 on "natural" claims.5 In October 2006, Hormel
petitioned the FSIS to codify its nonbinding definition of "natural" and to
prohibit exceptions for specific chemical preservatives and synthetic
ingredients.5 In December 2006, the USDA requested public comment on
the petition and received over 12,000 comments. 52 Finding that "the
comments demonstrate that there is a lack of industry and public consensus
on the meaning of 'natural,"' the FSIS stated that it was not prepared to
issue a proposed rule.53 Instead, in September 2009, it published an advance
notice of proposed rulemaking seeking additional public input.54 The FSIS
has taken no further action on the rulemaking.
III. CLAIMS ASSERTED IN "NATURAL" LABELING LAWSUITS
The complaints filed in "natural" labeling litigation tend to be very
similar, if not cookie-cutter. This section provides an overview of the claims
most frequently asserted by plaintiffs in these actions.
A. State Consumer Protection Statutes
1. California
The vast majority of "natural" labeling lawsuits, have been brought in
California courts in large part because California's consumer protection
laws are considered plaintiff friendly. Plaintiffs in these actions invoke the
protection of California's consumer protection trinity: (1) the Unfair
s Product Labeling: Definition of the Term "Natural," 71 Fed. Reg. 70,503, 70,504 (Dec. 5,
2006).
1 See id.; see also Hormel Foods Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 808 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D.D.C.
2011) (seeking a permanent injunction preventing USDA from approving the "natural" label for meat
and poultry products containing potassium lactate or sodium lactate without disclosure of that fact. The
court dismissed the case because USDA had not yet finished its rulemaking for natural foods and,
therefore, there was no final agency action subject to review under the Administrative Procedure Act).
s2 Product Labeling: Definition of the Term "Natural," 71 Fed. Reg. at 70,504; Product
Labeling- Use of the Voluntary Claim "Natural" in the Labeling of Meat and Poultry Products, 74 Fed.
Reg. 46,951, 46,953 (Dec. 5,2006) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 317, 381).
s3 Product Labeling: Use of the Voluntary Claim "Natural" in the Labeling of Meat and Poultry
Products, 74 Fed. Reg. at 46,956.
4 Id. at 46,956-57.
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Competition Law ("UCL"), s (2) the False Advertising Law ("FAL"),ss
and (3) the Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA")." The UCL
prohibits any "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and
unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising."58 The FAL makes it
unlawful for a business to disseminate any statement "which is untrue or
misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care
should be known, to be untrue or misleading."59 Any violation of the FAL
also constitutes a violation of the UCL.60 The CLRA prohibits "unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices."6' A
defendant may be held liable under the CLRA for deceptive sales practices,
including: representing the goods have ingredients they do not have;
representing the goods are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, if they
are not; and advertising goods with the intent not to sell them as
advertised. 2
Claims brought under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA are grounded in
fraud and governed by the "reasonable consumer" test.6' That test requires
plaintiffs to "show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.""
To prove that consumers are "likely to be deceived," plaintiffs must prove
that the allegedly deceptive statement "is such that it is probable that a
significant portion of the consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting
reasonably under the circumstances, could be misled."s6  A plaintiff must
have "extrinsic evidence, such as consumer survey data," and cannot rely on
merely anecdotal evidence to prove that a claim is likely to deceive
consumers.66
ss CAL. Bus. &PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2014).56 CAL. BUS. &PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2014).
s7 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770 (West 2014).
5 CAL. BUS. &PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2014).
5 CAL. Bus. &PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2014).
' Williams v. Gerber Products Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008).
61 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770 (West 2014).
62 Nagel v. Twin Labs., Inc., 109 Cal. App. 4th 39, 51-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (citing CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1770 (a)(5), (7) & (9) (2014)).
6 See Williams, 552 F.3d at 938.
64 Id.
65 Lavie v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 105 Cal. App. 4th 496, 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
66 Ries v. Ariz. Beverages USA LLC, No. 10-01139 RS, 2013 WL 1287416, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 28,2013) (citing Haskell v. Time, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 1398, 1407 (E.D. Cal. 1997)).
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Under all three acts, private litigants may be awarded restitution, 7 the
purpose of which is "to restore the status quo by returning to the plaintiff
funds in which he or she has an ownership interest. "6' The proper measure
of restitution in such cases is "[t]he difference between what the plaintiff
paid and the value of what the plaintiff received."69 In a food labeling case,
the measure is the "amount necessary to compensate the purchaser for the
difference between a produce as labeled and the product as received."7
While the amount of restitution "need not be determined with exact
precision,"71 the plaintiff must establish the price premium attributable to
the deceptive labeling claim.72
2. New York
A significant number of "natural" labeling suits have arisen in New
York and have asserted claims under New York General Business Law
Section 349 ("GBL § 349"). This statute prohibits "[d]eceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any business, trade, or commerce or in the
furnishing of any service."73 A cause of action under GBL § 349 is generally
"available to an individual consumer who falls victim to misrepresentations
made by a seller of consumer goods through false or misleading
advertising."74 The cause of action is available only to persons who were
deceived in transactions occurring within the State of New York.7s
67 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17203, 17535 (West 2004); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780(A)(3)
(West 2010).
6s Werdebaugh v. Blue Diamond Growers, No. 12-CV-02724-LHK, 2014 US Dist. LEXIS
173789, *27 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2014) (quoting Kor. Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal.
4th 1134, 1149 (2003).
69 Ries, 2013 WL 1287416 at *7 (quoting In re Vioxx Class Cases, 180 Cal. App. 4th 116, 131
(Cal. Ct. App. 2010)).
7
oWerdebaugh, 2014 US Dist. LEXIS 173789, *27.
n Ries, 2013 WL 1287416 at *7 (citing In re Google AdWords Litig., No. 5:08-CV-3369 EJD,
2012 WL 28068, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2012)).
72 Werdebaugh, 2014 US Dist. LEXIS 173789, *27.
73 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2014).
74 Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc., 720 N.E.2d 892, 897 (N.Y. 1999) (citing Genesco
Entm't v. Koch, 593 F. Supp. 743, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
s Rapcinsky v. Skinnygirl Cocktails, L.L.C., No. 11 Civ. 6546(JPO), 2013 WL 93636, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2013); Chiste v. Hotels.com, L.P., 756 F. Supp. 2d 382, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(quoting Goshen v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 N.Y.2d 314,325 (N.Y. 2002)).
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A plaintiff asserting a GBL § 349 claim must establish that: "(1) the
act or practice was consumer-oriented; (2) the act or practice was
misleading in a material respect; and (3) the plaintiff was injured as a
result."16 A statement is misleading, for purposes of a GBL § 349 claim, if
it is "likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the
circumstances."77 It is not necessary for a plaintiff to prove that he or she
actually relied on the alleged misrepresentation, but the plaintiff "must
show that defendant's material deceptive act caused the injury."" The fact
that a plaintiff paid a price premium because of a misrepresentation satisfies
the injury requirement.
3. Florida
The US District Court for the Southern District of Florida is
becoming an increasingly popular venue for food labeling cases. Under the
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA")," a
consumer seeking damages must prove: "(1) a deceptive act or unfair
practice; (2) causation; and (3) actual damages."" The plaintiff need not
establish that he or she relied on the deceptive act or unfair practice. 2
B. Unjust Enrichment
In some states, plaintiffs may recover for unjust enrichment if the
defendant received a benefit at the plaintiffs expense and retention of the
benefit would be unjust.8 In California, unjust enrichment is not an
independent cause of action; it is only a basis for obtaining restitution in
7 Spagniola v. Chubb Corp., 574 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir. 2009); accord Stutman v. Chem. Bank, 731
N.E.2d 608, 611 (N.Y. 2000).
n Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 126 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Oswego
Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, 647 N.E.2d 741, 745 (N.Y. 1995)).
n Stutman v. Chem. Bank, 731 N.E.2d 608, 611 (N.Y. 2000).
7 Bildstein v. MasterCard Int'l Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 410, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
so Fla. Stat.§ 501.201 et seq.
s Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 951 So. 2d 860, 869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
2 Fitzpatrick v. Gen. Mills, Inc. 635 F.3d 1279, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 2011).
* Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 509 (2d Cit. 2009) (describing elements plaintiff
must meet under New York law); VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 641 A.2d 519, 522 (NJ. 1994)
(concluding that unjust enrichment may constitute grounds for an equitable lien under New Jersey law).
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quasi-contract. 84 In jurisdictions where unjust enrichment is recognized as a
cause of action, plaintiffs must show that the benefit received was "less than
what they bargained for."" Such a claim may be asserted against a
manufacturer, even if the plaintiff bought the product from a third-party
retailer.86 For example, one court held that a plaintiff adequately stated a
claim for unjust enrichment under Florida law where the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant launched a deceptive marketing campaign and
capitalized on (i.e., benefited from) consumer demand for natural
products.87
C. Warranty Claims
1. Breach ofExpress Warranty
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, an express warranty is any
affirmation of fact or promise that relates to the goods or any description of
the goods that becomes part of the basis of the bargain.88 To prove a breach
of express warranty, a plaintiff must show that there was an "affirmation of
fact or promise by the seller, the natural tendency of which was to induce
the buyer to purchase and that the warranty was relied upon to the
plaintiffs detriment."89 As breach of express warranty is a breach of
contract, the injured party is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, which is
measured as the difference between the value of the product received and
value of the product as warranted."
' Brazil v. Dole Food Co., 935 F. Supp. 2d 947, 965 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Levine v. Blue Shield of
Cal., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262, 279 (Ct. App. 2010).
's Vigiletti v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 838 N.Y.S.2d 785 (App. Div. 2007).
16 Stewart v. Beam Global Spirits & Wine, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 192, 194 (D.N.J. 2012).
" Lynch v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., No. 2:11-cv-07382 (DMC) (JAD), 2013 WL 2645050, at *10
(D.N.J. June 12, 2013).
8 U.C.C. § 2-313 (2014); N.Y. U.C.C. §2-313 (McKinney 1962); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-
313 (West 1961).
" Fendi Adele S.RL. v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 689 F. Supp. 2d 585, 604
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (NY law); see also Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp., 185 Cal. App. 3d 135, 142
(Ct. App. 1986) (Under California law, to adequately plead a cause of action for breach of express
warranty, "one must allege the exact terms of the warranty, plaintiffs reasonable reliance thereon, and a
breach of that warranty which proximately causes plaintiff injury.").
' Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 500 F.3d 171, 184-85 (2d Cir. 2007) (NY
law).
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2. Breach oflmplied Warranty ofMerchantability
Under the UCC, as adopted in state law, "a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind."" Goods are merchantable if
they:
(a) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description; and (b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair
average quality within the description; and (c) are fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and (d) run,
within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units
involved; and (e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled
as the agreement may require; and (f) conform to the promises or
affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.92
To establish an implied warranty of merchantability claim, the plaintiff
must show that the product "did not possess even the most basic degree of
fitness for ordinary use."93 However, no implied warranty exists unless the
plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract for the sale of the product at
issue or the plaintiff was the direct purchaser of the product.94
3. Violation ofMagnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA")
The federal M1IWA, 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq., provides a private
cause of action for "a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier,
warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under [15
91 U.C.C. § 2-314 (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-314(l) (West 1961); N.Y. U.C.C. §2-
314(1) (McKinney 1962).
9 U.C.C. § 2-314(2) (2014); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-314(2) (West 1961); N.Y. U.C.C. § 2- -
314(2) (McKinney 1962).
3 Viggiano v. Hansen Natural Corp., 944 F. Supp. 2d 877, 896 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (citing Mocek
v. Alfa Leisure, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 4th 402, 406 (2003)).
94 Chin v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 12-2150 (MJD/TNL), 2013 WL 2420455, at *6 (D. Minn. June
3, 2013).
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U.S.C. Chapter 50], or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or
service contract."9s The MMWA defines a "written warranty" as:
Any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in
connection with the sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a
buyer which relates to the nature of the material or workmanship
and affirms or promises that such material or workmanship is
defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a
specified period of time.9 6
Therefore, to constitute a written warranty, a statement must affirm or
promise that such material or workmanship (1) is defect free or (2) will
meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time.97
According to the Federal Trade Commission's interpretation of the statute,
representations that may qualify as express warranties under the Uniform
Commercial Code are not necessarily written warranties under the
MMWA.98
The MMWA defines an "implied warranty" as "an implied warranty
arising under state law."99 Therefore, state law supplies the elements of and
defenses to a claim for breach of implied warranty under the MVMWA.'oo
D. Promissory Estoppel
In some "natural" labeling cases, plaintiffs have asserted promissory
estoppel claims. Promissory estoppel is a "legal fiction," which acts as a
"substitute for contractual consideration where one party relied on another's
promise without having entered into an enforceable contract."' 0 Under
New York law, a claim for promissory estoppel requires proof of: (1) "a dear
and unambiguous promise," (2) "a reasonable and foreseeable reliance by
9 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (2014).
96 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A).
97 Id.
98 16 C.F.R. § 700.3(a) (2014).
* 15 U.S.C. § 2301(7).
'0 See Chin, 2013 WL 2420455, at *6.
101 Bader v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 773 F. Supp. 2d 397,414 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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the party to whom the promise is made," and (3) "an injury sustained by the
party asserting the estoppel by reason of the reliance."102 In some states,
promissory estoppel requires the additional element of "[i]njustice [which]
can be avoided only by the enforcement of the promise."103
IV. POSSIBLE DEFENSES
The defenses discussed below are commonly asserted in "natural" food
labeling litigation. Because this type of litigation is still relatively new and
very few appellate decisions exist, any conclusions about the strengths of
these defenses are necessarily subject to change. However, some clear
patterns of rulings have emerged in the decisions to date.
A. Failure To State A Claim
Given the liberal pleading standard in federal court, motions to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim
are difficult to win. However, some defendants in "natural" food labeling
class actions have succeeded in having certain claims dismissed. Defendants
have been particularly successful in having courts dismiss MMWA violation
claims at the pleading stage. In Bates v. Kashi, the court dismissed MMWA
violation claims based on its finding that the Act did not apply to food
labeling.'" Rather, the court found that Congress intended the Act to cover
products like automobiles and home appliances to protect consumers' right
to have defective products repaired.'0 s Other courts have routinely found
that the representation that a product is "natural" is a product description,
not a written warranty under the MM\WA." Courts also have dismissed
102 Cyberchron Corp. v. Calldata Sys. Dev., Inc., 47 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
103 Hurwitz v. Prime Commc'ns., Inc., No. 91-006694, 1994 WL 561834, at *3 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Apr. 4, 1994), affd, Hurwitz v. Bocian, No. 94-P-1890, 670 N.E.2d 408 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996).
10 See Bates v. Kashi Co., No. 11-CV-1967-H (BGS), slip op. at 15 (S.D. Cal. July 16,2012).
s Id. at 14-15.
1o6 E.g., Viggiano v. Hansen Natural Corp., 944 F. Supp. 2d 877, 898 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Chin v.
Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 0:12-CV-02150 (MJD/INL), 2013 WL 2420455, at *6 (D. Minn. June 3, 2013)
(dismissing MMWA written warranty claim); Jones v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 2d 889, 903-
04 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that "100% natural" descriptions on PAM cooking spray, Hunt's canned
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claims for implied warranty of merchantability under the MMWA and
state law because the plaintiffs did not purchase the products at issue
directly from the defendant manufacturers.107
With regard to express warranties, some defendants have successfully
argued that the disclosure of allegedly unnatural ingredients on the product
label limited the scope of the alleged warranty. Under the UCC, warranties
are "construed as consistent with each other and as cumulative," and
"[e]xact or technical specifications displace an inconsistent sample or model
or general language of description.""os Thus, in Chin v. General Mills, Inc.,
the court dismissed an express warranty claim holding that the "100%
Natural" statement on the product label "must be read in the context of the
entire package, including the ingredient panel."' 09 The court held that the
"specific terms determine the scope of the express warranty."110
In contrast to warranty claims, claims brought under California's
consumer protection laws are rarely dismissed at the pleading stage because
"California courts . . . have recognized that whether a business practice is
deceptive will usually be a question of fact not appropriate for decision on
demurrer.""' Moreover, under the California consumer protection statutes,
the fact that a product's ingredients were disclosed on the package does not
preclude a finding that the plaintiffs relied on allegedly deceptive "natural"
claims." 2 Thus, it is a "rare situation" for courts to dismiss claims alleging
violations of California consumer protection laws."' However, in a few
tomato products, and Swiss Miss cocoa did not constitute written warranties under MMWA);
Anderson v. Jamba Juice Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ("'All Natural' is a general
product description rather than a promise that the product is defect free . . . . Therefore the language
'All Natural' on the smoothie kits' labels did not create a written warranty within the meaning of the
MMWA."); Astiana v. Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc., Nos. C-11-2910 EMC, C-11-3164 EMC,
2012 WL 2990766, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2012) (dismissing MMWA claim holding that "all
natural" statement on ice cream products is a product description and does not constitute a written
warranty); Bates, slip op. at 14.
107 Chin, 2013 WL 2420455, at *7 (dismissing implied warranty claims under MMWA and state
law based on finding that "Plaintiffs have not pled that a contract or agreement existed between
themselves and General Mills and the Court finds that Plaintiffs were not direct purchasers.").
o U.C.C. § 2-317 (2013).
" Chin, 2013 WL 2420455, at *7.
11 d.
n1 Williams, v. Gerber Products Co., 552 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2008).
112 See id. at 939 ("We disagree . . . that reasonable consumers should be expected to look beyond
misleading representations on the front of the box to discover the truth from the ingredient list in small
print on the side of the box.").
113 See id.
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cases, California courts have found allegations of deceptive food labeling to
be so implausible that they were deemed not deceptive as a matter of law.
For example, courts found that no reasonable consumer could be misled to
believe that "Froot Loops" and "Cap'n Crunch's Crunch Berries" cereals
contained real fruit." 4 In a case alleging that Nestle violated California's
consumer protection laws by labeling its Buitoni pasta products "all
natural," the court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim because she
did not offer a plausible definition of "all natural" and because, in the
context in which the phrase was used on the packaging (immediately above
the list of ingredients), no reasonable consumer could have been
deceived."s
B. Failure To Plead Fraud With Specificity
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires, "in all
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake shall be stated with particularity.""' This rule applies not only to
claims of common law fraud, but also to causes of action that "sound in
fraud," including unjust enrichment and claims under state consumer
protection statutes. 1 7 The heightened pleading standard is meant to give
defendants "notice of the claims against them, provides an increased
measure of protection for their reputations, and reduces the number of
frivolous suits brought solely to extract settlements.""' It requires the
plaintiff to allege the "the who, what, when, where, and how of the events
H4 See Werbel ex re. v. Pepsico, Inc., No. C 09-04456 SBA, 2010 WL 2673860, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
July 2, 2010); Sugawara v. PepsiCo, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-01335-MCE-JFM, 2009 WL 1439115, at *3-4
(E.D. Cal. May 21, 2009) (same); McKinnis v. Kellogg USA, No. CV 07-2611, 2007 WL 4766060, at
31 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2007); Videtto v. Kellogg USA, No. 2:08-cv-01324-MCE-DAD, 2009 WL
1439086, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 21, 2009).
u5 Pelayo v. Neste USA, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 2d 973, 980 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
116 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9.
117 Chin, 2013 WVL 2420455, at *8; Janney v. Gen. Mills, 944 F. Supp. 2d 806, 817 (N.D. Cal.
2013) ("When claims under the CLRA, UCL, and FAL are based on a manufacturer's alleged
misrepresentations about a product's characteristics, those claims sound in fraud and Rule 9(b)
applies.").
us In re Burlington Coat Factory Secs. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1418 (3d Cir. 1997).
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at issue."" 9 In addition, the plaintiff must "set forth what is false or
misleading about a statement and why it is false."120
Courts considering motions to dismiss "natural" labeling suits for
failure to plead fraud with the required specificity have reached inconsistent
results. Some courts have found that plaintiffs satisfy the Rule 9(b) standard
even when the plaintiffs' complaints include only vague allegations about
the exact products at issue or the reasons why the defendants' "natural"
claims were deceptive, or when they have omitted allegations about the
specific dates of their purchases.' 1 For example, in Astiana v. Ben &Jerry's
Homemade, Inc., the court held the plaintiffs adequately pled their claims
under Rule 9(b) because the court could discern:
The "who" is [defendants] Ben & Jerry's, Breyers, and Unilever.
The "what" is the statement that ice cream containing alkalized
cocoa is "all natural." The "when" is alleged as "since at least
2006," and "throughout the class period." The "where" is on the
ice cream package labels. The "how the statements were
misleading" is the allegation that defendants did not disclose that
the alkalizing agent in the alkalized cocoa was potassium
carbonate, which plaintiffs allege is a "synthetic."1 22
119 Hemy v. Perdue Farms, Inc., No. 11-888 (FLW), 2011 WL 6002463, at *13 (D.N.J. Nov. 30,
2011); see also Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003); Parnes v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 550 (8th Cir. 1997).
120 Decker v. GlenFed, Inc., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994).
121 See Lynch v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., No. 2:11-cv-07382 (DMC) (JAD), 2013 WL 2645050,
at *7 (D.N.J. June 12, 2013); Janney, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 817-18 (explaining that Rule 9(b) is satisfied
where plaintiffs alleged the terms "Natural" or "100% Natural" were deceptively used on the packaging
or advertising because those products contain HFCS, HMCS, and/or Maltodextrin as ingredients; that
during the class period, plaintiffs purchased specific Nature Valley products; that plaintiffs purchased
"certain varieties" of Nature Valley bars "relying on the claims that they were "Natural"; and that
General Mills represented products were "natural" in order to "capitalize on" "all-natural foods");
Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (stating that Rule 9(b) is
met where plaintiff identifies particular statements alleged to be misleading, the basis for contention,
where the statements appear, and the relevant time period in which statements were used); Astiana v.
Ben &Jerry's Homemade, Inc., Nos. C 10-4387 PJH, C 10-4937 PJH, 2011 WL 2111796, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. May 26, 2011); but qf Brazil v. Dole Food Co., 935 F. Supp. 2d 947, 964-65 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(explaining the standard is not met where plaintiff fails to specifically identify the products at issue in
the case, fails to identify the specific federal regulations allegedly violated, and does not clearly identify
the alleged misrepresentations on which plaintiff relied).
1
2 2Astiana, 2011 WL 2111796, at *6.
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Other courts have applied more rigorous standards. For example, in
Chin v. General Mills, Inc., the court held that the plaintiffs did not satisfy
Rule 9(b) because they failed to plead how the "100% Natural" statement
deceived them and did not allege with specificity what they believed "100%
Natural" to mean.123 Similarly, in Briseno v. Conagra Foods, Inc., the court
held that the plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 9(b) because the plaintiff
failed to allege the dates of purchases when he saw or heard the alleged
misrepresentations, the dates when the defendant made the allegedly
deceptive statements, and how often he was exposed to the allegedly
deceptive statements. 124
C. Federal Preemption
The federal preemption doctrine, which is based on the Supremacy
Clause of the US Constitution, 125 invalidates state laws that 'interfere with,
or are contrary to,' federal law."126 There are three types of federal
preemption: (1) express preemption stated in a federal statute; (2) implied
preemption where federal law fully occupies a regulatory field leaving no
room for state regulation;127 and (3) implied conflict preemption where it
would be impossible for a private party to comply with both the state and
federal requirements1 28 or, alternatively, where state "law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution" of Congress's objectives. 129
Federal law preempts state law requirements codified in statutes or
regulations as well as court-imposed requirements arising from state law
causes of action. 30 Other formal agency actions that have the force.of law,
123 Chin v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 0:12-CV-02150 (MJD/TNL), 2013 WL 2420455, t *9 (D.
Minn. June 3, 2013); see also Bates v. Kashi Co., No. 11-CV-1967-H (BGS), slip op. at 18 (S.D. Cal.
July 16, 2012) (holding plaintiffi failed to plead common law fraud claim with required specificity).
124 See Briseno v. Conagra Foods, Inc., No. CV 11-05379 MMM (AGRx), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 154750, at *36-38 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23,2011).
125 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
126 Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985) (quoting
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824)).
127 See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 111 (2000) (applying field preemption).
128 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
129 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
130 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 443 (2005).
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such as agency adjudications, also have a preemptive effect.131 A state law
requirement may be preempted whether it imposes an affirmative
obligation or prohibits certain conduct.132
In determining whether federal law preempts state law, courts "start
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not
to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the dear and manifest
purpose of Congress.""3  Where the federal government regulates an area
traditionally within the states' police powers, the presumption against
preemption requires a narrow reading of express preemption statutes.134
Regulation of food marketing and labeling historically has been the
province of the states, and therefore, courts assume such regulation is not to
be preempted unless Congress dearly intended otherwise.3 s
1. Express Preemption
"Natural" labeling cases have focused almost exclusively on food and
beverages within the FDA's jurisdiction, as opposed to meat and poultry
products within the USDA's jurisdiction, 3  likely because express
preemption under the FMIA and PPIA provides such a strong defense.13 1
Those acts state, in relevant part, "Marking, labeling, packaging, or
ingredient requirements in addition to, or different than, those made under
this Act may not be imposed by any State . . . ." In deciding whether
state law imposes a requirement for meat or poultry product labeling "in
addition to, or different than" federal law, courts have found that federal
law preempt state requirements even when the subject matter of the state
requirements is not addressed in any FMIA or PPIA provisions or in any
131 Holkv. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 340 (3d Cir. 2009).
132 See Nat'l Broiler Council v. Voss, 44 F.3d 740, 743-45 (9th Cir. 1994).
"' Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134 id.
.3s Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143-44 (1963); Holk, 575 F.3d at
334-35; In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170, 1176 (Cal. 2008).
136 See Krzykwa v. Campbell Soup Co., 946 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1373-74 (S.D. Fla. 2013)
(mentioning that plaintiff amended complaint to drop allegations about soups containing poultry).
137 See Barnes v. Campbell Soup Co., No. C 12-05185 JSW, 2013 WL 5530017, at*5 (N.D. Cal.
July 25, 2013) (holding that claims as to chicken soup products were preempted by FMIA and PPIA).
138 21 U.S.C. § 678 (2014); id. § 467e (substantially identical).
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USDA regulations.13 9 The rationale for federal preemption of state labeling
requirements for meat and poultry products is especially strong because
USDA must preapprove labels for such products.'40 Because the labels must
be USDA approved, courts have found that state law claims challenging the
labels are necessarily preempted.141 In particular, "[b]ecause the [USDA]
pre-approval process includes a determination of whether the labeling is
false and misleading," state law claims alleging that USDA-approved labels
are false or misleading are preempted.142 The USDA's pre-approval of
labels is a significant difference in the federal labeling regime for meat and
poultry products compared to other food products, for which no approval is
required.
In contrast to the FMIA and PPIA, the FDCA likely does not
expressly preempt state law claims regarding "natural" labeling. The
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 ("NLEA") amended the
FDCA with the intent to "establish uniform national standards for the
nutritional claims and the required nutrient information displayed on food
labels." 143 The NLEA added an express preemption provision, codified at
21 U.S.C. § 343-1, prohibiting state requirements that are "not identical
139 See Nat'1 Broiler Council v. Voss, 44 F.3d 740, 747 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding state requirement
limiting use of "fresh" in poultry labeling was preempted by PPIA even though USDA regulations did
not address the definition of "fresh"); Am. Meat Inst. v. Leeman, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 759, 784-85 n.38
(Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that FMIA preempted plaintiffs claim to enforce Proposition 65 warning
requirements for dioxins and PCBs with regard to beef products where no federal rule addressed the
issue); Boulahanis v. Prevo's Family Mkt., Inc.,583 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting
plaintiffs argument that state law claim was not preempted by FMIA because USDA had not regulated
E. coli as an adulterant at the relevant time based on the finding that USDA's intentional decision not
to regulate had preemptive force).
14 21 U.S.C. § 457(c) (stating that FMIA and PPIA both provide that no food article "shall be
sold or offered for sale by any person in commerce, under any name or other marking or labeling. . .but
established trade names and other marking and labeling and containers which are not false or misleading
and which are approved by the Secretary."); see id. § 607(d) (substantially similar language in FMIA); see
also 9 C.F.R. § 317.8(a) (2013).
"4 E.g., Meaunrit v. ConAgra Foods Inc., No. C 09-02220 CRB, 2010 WL 2867393, at *7
(N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010) (distinguishing USDA pre-approved labels from labeling requirements under
the jurisdiction of the FDA, which does not require pre-approval, and reasoning that "the USDA and
FSIS pre-approved ConAgra's labeling, which means that any liability Plaintiff seeks to attach based on
a state law would impose requirements on ConAgra additional to, or different than federal law");
Meaunrit v. Pinnacle Foods Grp., LLC, No. C 09-04555 CW, 2010 WL 1838715, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
May 5, 2010) ("To allow a jury to pass judgment on Defendant's labels, notwithstanding the USDA's
approval, would disrupt the federal regulatory scheme.").
142 Meaunrit, 2010 WL 2867393, at *7.
143 H.R. REP. No. 101-538, at 14 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3336, 3342.
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to" several enumerated labeling provisions of the FDCA.'" Thus, where
state law requirements are identical to the FDCA-for example, when a
plaintiffs claim effectively seeks to enforce the FDCA-courts find no
preemption. 145
Courts have found the NLEA's preemption language to apply only
where (1) the FDCA or its implementing regulations address the issue and
(2) state law would require different labeling than that which federal law
specifically permitted or prohibited."6 For example, in Turek v. General
'" 21 C.F.R. § 100.1(c)(4) (1991) (regulating the following: "'Not identical to' does not refer to
the specific words in the requirement but instead means that the State requirement directly or indirectly
imposes obligations or contains provisions concerning the composition or labeling of food, or
concerning a food container, that: (i) Are not imposed by or contained in the applicable provision
(including any implementing regulation) of [21 USC § 341, definitions and standards for food] or [21
USC § 343, misbranded food] of the act; or (ii) Differ from those specifically imposed by or contained
in the applicable provision (including any implementing regulation) of [21 USC § 341, definitions and
standards for food] or [21 USC § 343, misbranded food] of the act.").
145 Turek v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 662 F.3d 423, 426 (7th Cir. 2011) ("The state thus can impose the
identical requirement or requirements, and by doing so be enabled, because of the narrow scope of the
preemption provision in the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, to enforce a violation of the Act as
a violation of state law."); Lynch v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., No. 2:11-cv-07382 (DMC) (JAD), 2013
WL 2645050, at *5 (D.N.J. June 12, 2013) (holding plaintiffs' claims are not preempted where they
enforce requirements identical to federal law regarding standard of identity and ingredients labeling);
Astiana v. Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc., Nos. C-11-2910 EMC, C-11-3164 EMC, 2012 WL
2990766, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2012) (holding that a state law claim predicated on violation of the
federal labeling law was not preempted because "Plaintiffs do not seek to impose a higher standard of
conduct"); Stewart v. Smart Balance, Inc., No. 11-6174 (JLL), 2012 WL 4168584, at *6 (D.N.J. June
26, 2012) (holding plaintiffs' claims regarding "fat free" labeling were not preempted where the
"gravamen of Plaintiffs' complaint is precisely that Defendants' products are misleading because they fail
to comply []with [the FDCA and regulations]."); Smajlaj v. Campbell Soup Co., 782 F. Supp. 2d 84, 97
(D.N.J. 2011) (holding plaintiffs' arguments that "less sodium" claims were misleading was not
preempted because they mirrored federal requirements, but claims that labels omitted material
information were preempted because they would impose a requirement inconsistent with federal
regulations); Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2010); In re Farm
Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170, 1175 (Cal. 2008) ("[S]tates may establish their own requirements
pertaining to the labeling of artificially colored food so long as their requirements are identical to those
contained in the FDCA . . . ."); see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 447 (2005)
(holding, in pesticide labeling case, state law labeling is not preempted "if it is equivalent to, and fully
consistent with, FIFRA's misbranding provisions"); Jones v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 2d 889,
896-97 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding claims not preempted where state law requirements "are effectively
the same" or "substantially the same" as federal law).
" Lam v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that state law
claims that "fruit flavored" and "naturally flavored" labels are false and misleading were preempted by 21
U.S.C. § 343(k) and 21 C.F.R. § 101.22(i), which expressly permitted the labeling at issue); Yumul v.
Smart Balance, Inc., No. CV 10-00927 MMM (AJWx), 2011 WL 1045555, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Mar.
14, 2011) (holding state law claims to enjoin "no cholesterol" and "healthy" labeling were preempted
because such labeling is "permitted by the NLEA and its accompanying regulations"); In re PepsiCo,
Inc., 588 F. Supp. 2d 527, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding preemption of state law claims that Aquafina
bottled water was labeled to mislead consumers into believing the water came from a source other than a
municipal water supply because "(1) federal law is not silent on the subject of implied labeling
misrepresentations regarding the municipal source of bottled water, and (2) given that the Aquafina label
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Mills, the plaintiffs challenged statements in the "Nutrition Facts" box of
Kellogg's Fiber Plus bars declaring that the product contained nine grams
of dietary fiber and other label claims that the product contained "35% of
your daily fiber."147 The plaintiffs alleged that such claims were deceptive
because the product labeling did not disclose that the principal source of
fiber in the product was unnatural inulin processed from chicory root (a
product which is also allegedly inferior and harmful).'48 The court found
that the defendants' products complied with FDA regulations regarding
labeling of dietary fiber, which are incorporated in the NLEA's express
preemption provision for nutrient content claims.149 Because the disclaimers
plaintiffs sought to require on the labeling of defendants' products were not
identical to federal requirements, they were preempted. 10
Likewise, courts have held that state law claims regarding "natural
flavor" labels are expressly preempted.15 1 In Viggiano v. Hansen Natural
Corp., plaintiffs alleged that the "all natural flavors" label on defendant's
Hansen's Diet Premium Sodas was deceptive because the products
contained the allegedly synthetic sweeteners and flavor enhancers
acesulfame potassium ("ace-k") and sucralose.152 The defendant argued that
the NLEA provision regarding labeling "of the type required by section [§
343(k)]," the provision of FDCA regarding labeling of artificial flavoring,
expressly preempted the plaintiffs' claims.15 3 FDA regulations allow the
phrase "natural flavor" to be used even when a product contains artificial
flavors, so long as the "characterizing flavor" is natural.154 The court held
that Hansen's Diet Premium Sodas complied with federal regulations, and,
therefore, plaintiffs' claims were expressly preempted.1s' The court
fits within the exception for purified water and thus complies with the FDCA's requirements, Plaintiffs
state law claims by necessity are premised on requirements that are not parallel to those imposed by
federal law.").
147 Turek, 662 F.3d at 425.
148 Id. at 425-26.
149 Id. at 427.
15 id
151 Viggiano v. Hansen Natural Corp., 944 F. Supp. 2d 877, 888 (C.D. Cal. 2013); see also Lam,
859 F. Supp. 2d at 1102-03; Ivie v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1042 (N.D. Cal.
2013).
1s2 Viggiano, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 881-82.
1s3 Id. at 890 n. 35 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(3)).
154 Id. at 888 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 101.22(i)(1)).
155 Id. at 889-90.
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reasoned, "[a]s FDA regulations explicitly authorized Hansen to label the
product as it did, any state law requiring Hansen to use additional or
different labeling would not be ... identical to FDA regulations and would
be preempted by the FDCA."5 6
Conversely, courts have held that state law is not preempted when no
provision in the FDCA or FDA regulations addresses the subject matter of
a state law requirement,'s It is for this reason that courts have held that
state law causes of action challenging general "natural" claims are not
expressly preempted. There is no provision of FDCA or FDA regulation
governing the use of "natural" claims. Moreover, the FDCA's general
prohibition on "false or misleading" labeling, 21 U.S.C. § 343(a), is not
included in the list of provisions that preempt non-identical state law.
Therefore, courts have held that the NLEA's express preemption provision
"does not preempt the claims arising from false or misleading labels
regulated by section 343(a)."'ss
1s6 Id. at 890.
157 E.g., Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding
that a state law claim that would require mercury warnings was not preempted because the FDA had
not taken formal action regarding mercury warnings); Astiana v. Ben &Jerry's Homemade, Inc., Nos. C
10-4387 PJH, C 10-4937 PJH, 2011 WL 2111796, at *10 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2011) (holding that a
state law claim alleging that an "all natural" label was deceptive was not preempted because there is no
federal regulation about the word "natural"); Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F. Supp. 2d 1111,
1123-24 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding that a claim that labeling a product as "wholesome" was misleading
was not preempted because the "wholesome" label is not regulated by FDA); Lockwood v. ConAgra
Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding no federal field preemption in the
context of labeling foods as "natural"); Guerrero v. Target Corp., 889 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1360-61 (S.D.
Fla. 2012) (holding that a state law deceptive trade practices claim for labeling products as "honey" that
did not comply with Florida Honey Standard was not preempted by the FDCA because there is no
federal standard of identity for honey); ef In re Pepsico, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 2d 527, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(stating "where federal requirements address the subject matter that is being challenged through state
law claims, such state law claims are preempted to the extent they do not impose identical
requirements."); see Perea v. Walgreen Co., 939 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1038-39 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (holding
that California's honey standard was expressly preempted even though there is no federal standard of
identity for honey).
15s Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural Beverage Co., 268 F.R.D. 365, 370 (N.D. Cal. 2010); see also Ries
v. Homell Brewing Co., No. 10-1139-JF (PVT), 2010 WL 2943860, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2010)
(finding that "because Section 343(a) is not enumerated among the preemption provisions of'21 U.S.C.
§ 343-1(a), states are free to set their own standards as to whether 'labeling is false or misleading in any
particular,'. . ."); Thurston v. Bear Naked, Inc., No. 11-CV-02890, slip op. 1. 6-7 (S.D. Cal. July 16,
2012) (holding that "because Defendant does not specify which subsection of § 343 would be violated,
and because there is no subsection of § 343 listed under § 343-1(a) that addresses labeling food items as
'natural,' the Court concludes that Defendant's express preemption argument fails."); Bates v. Kashi Co.,
No. 11-CV-1967-H (BGS), slip op. at 6-7 (same).
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2. Implied Preemption
The NLEA provides that it "shall not be construed to preempt any
provision of State law, unless such provision is expressly preempted under
section [343-1(a)] ."1s Courts have interpreted this language to mean that,
"courts may not find implied preemption based on any provision of
NLEA"; however, other parts of the FDCA may impliedly preempt state
law."'o Nevertheless, at least since the Third Circuit's decision in Holk v.
Snapple Beverage Corp., courts have consistently held that "natural" labeling
lawsuits are not impliedly preempted. 161 In Holk, the court held that neither
implied field preemption nor conflict preemption barred the plaintiffs
challenge to Snapple's "natural" label on beverages containing high fructose
corn syrup.162
(a) Implied Field Preemption
Several factors support the view that the FDCA and FDA regulations
do not fill the field of regulation with regard to "natural" claims. First,
Congress added only limited express preemption provisions to the FDCA,
which shows that it is aware of state regulation of food labeling and has
decided not to fully occupy that field. 6 1 Second, the fact that Congress did
not provide a private right of action in the FDCA shows that Congress
views state actions as providing "appropriate relief for injured
consumers." 164 Third, the existence of extensive FDA regulations regarding
food labeling is insufficient to show that the federal government fully
159 Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 6(c)(1), 104 Stat.
2353, 2364 (1990).
"s Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 336 (3d Cir. 2009).
161 id.
162 See id.
163 Holk, 575 F.3d at 338; see also Wright v. Gen. Mills, Inc., Civ. No. 08-CV-1532-L (NLS),
2009 WL 3247148, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009) (stating "although the FDA has promulgated
several food-labeling requirements, Congress has specifically indicated that it does not intend to occupy
the field of food and beverage nutritional labeling and states are permitted to regulate matters covered by
the NLEA and its regulations provided that such state laws do not fall within the FDCA's express
preemption provisions.").
" Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574 (2009).
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occupies the field and preempts state regulation.16 5 Finally, the fact that
FDA has declined to undertake formal rulemaking regarding "natural"
claims, particularly when it was aware of state regulation of the term
"natural," shows that the FDA does not intend to fully occupy the field.16
(b) Implied Conflict Preemption
Another type of implied preemption is implied conflict preemption.
Federal law impliedly preempts state law "to the extent that it actually
conflicts with federal law."16  Conflict preemption exists "where it is
impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal
requirements, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."'68
In Holk, the Third Circuit determined that the plaintiffs state law
claims could not conflict with federal law because there was no federal law
on "natural" claims. 169 In reaching that conclusion, the court considered the
regulatory record of the FDA's policy on "natural" claims, as well as FDA
enforcement actions (warning letters) based on the policy, and determined
that the FDA had not undertaken the kind of formal, deliberative process
required for agency action to have the force of law. 70
s6 Holk, 575 F.3d at 339 (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 87 (1990)).
'" Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028,1034 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
167 English, 496 U.S. at 79.168 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
169 See Holk, 575 F.3d at 340-42.
17 Id.; see also Briseno v. Conagra Foods, Inc., No. CV 11-05379 MMM (AGRx), 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 154750 at *16, *26 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2011) (finding FDA's informal policies re:
"natural" claims and labeling of genetically modified foods not entitled to preemptive effect); Astiana v.
Ben &Jerry's Homemade, Inc., C 10-4387 PJH, 2011 WL 2111796, at *10 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2011)
(concluding "there is no indication of any regulation of the use of an adjective such as 'natural' on a food
label. Accordingly, the court finds that the claims are not preempted."); Ries v. Hornell Brewing Co.,
10-1139-JF (PVT), 2010 WL 2943860, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2010) (stating that "Because the FDA
has not yet defined "natural" under regulations pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 341, state laws that would
define that term are not clearly preempted by the NLEA."); Wright v. Gen. Mills, Inc., Civ. No.
08cv1532 L(NLS), 2009 WL 3247148, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009) (explaining that "because the
FDA has deferred taking regulatory action with respect to the term 'natural,' plaintiffs state law claims
do not stand as an obstacle to accomplishing Congress's objectives of uniformity and consistency in
regulating labeling."); Hitt v. Arizona Beverage Co., No. 08cv809 WQH (POR), 2009 WL 449190, at
*5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2009) (holding that defendants promoting drinks as "100% Natural" and "All
Natural" when they contained high fructose corn syrup was not preempted).
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In the more recent case of Bates v. Kasbi Co., a federal district court in
California took the position that the FDA's policy on "natural" claims
might have a preemptive effect.171 However, the court ruled that the
defendant's motion to dismiss on conflict preemption grounds was
essentially premature. In other words, the court found that the record was
not yet developed enough at the pleadings state to determine whether there
was a conflict between the plaintiffs' claims and federal law.172 The court
noted that the FDA's policy on "natural" claims turned on whether a
consumer would normally expect the products to contain artificial or
synthetic ingredients. Determining whether Kashi's products conformed
with FDA's definition of "natural," therefore, was "a question better suited
for summary judgment."17 4 The case subsequently settled without revisiting
this issue.175
D. Primary jurisdiction Doctrine
The primary jurisdiction doctrine is another defense that has been
asserted in "natural" claims litigation. Several courts have agreed with
defendants' contentions that, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
FDA action is more appropriate than litigation to resolve "natural" food
labeling disputes. However, because the FDA has declined to act in these
cases, these defense victories have, for the most part, been short lived.
Primary jurisdiction is a "prudential doctrine under which courts may,
under appropriate circumstances, determine that the initial decision-making
responsibility should be performed by the relevant agency rather than the
courts."7" To warrant such deference, Congress must have vested the
agency "with the authority to regulate an industry or activity such that it
171 Bates v. Kashi Co., No. 11-CV-1967-H (BGS), slip op. at 7-8 (S.D. Cal. July 16, 2012)
(equating the FDA's guidance document on labeling products as "natural" with the FDA's guidance
document on contact lens solution [a document which led to preemption of state claims in the area on
contact lens solution]. This relied on the proposition that where the FDA has provided guidance in
some area, any additional conditions imposed by state law in the same area are preempted).
172 Id.
u7s Astiana v. Kashi Co., No. 11-CV-1967-H (BGS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127624, at *10
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2014).
176 Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 780 (9th Cir. 2002).
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would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme to deny the agency's power
to resolve the issues in question."' 77 Application of the doctrine does not
imply that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, but rather, that the
case "requires resolution of an issue of first impression, or of a particularly
complicated issue that Congress has committed to a regulatory agency. "17s
In deciding whether to stay or dismiss a case on the grounds of primary
jurisdiction, courts consider four factors:
(1) The need to resolve an issue that (2) has been placed by
Congress within the jurisdiction of an administrative body having
regulatory authority (3) pursuant to a statute that subjects an
industry or activity to a comprehensive regulatory authority that
(4) requires expertise or uniformity in administration. "179
Although not controlling on a court's decision, FDA regulations state
that, "FDA has primary jurisdiction to make the initial determination on
issues within its statutory mandate."180
The fact that FDA has not taken formal action to regulate "natural"
claims in food labeling has mixed implications for the application of
primary jurisdiction. On the one hand, some courts have been reluctant to
enter into an area that the agency with primary jurisdiction has not yet
resolved, out of concern that the court's decision will ultimately conflict
with the agency's judgment. On the other hand, some courts have viewed
the FDA's failure to act as a sign that the FDA has no interest in exercising
its jurisdiction with regard to "natural" claims.
Astiana v. Hain Celestial Group, a case challenging "natural" labeling of
cosmetic products, demonstrates the concern over encroaching on the
FDA's turf. In that case, the court held that:
[I]n the absence of any FDA rules or regulations (or even
informal policy statements) regarding the use of the word 'natural'
on cosmetics labels, the court declines to make any independent
17 United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 828 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1987).
" Brown v. MCI WorldCom Network Servs., Inc., 277 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2002).
' Syntek, 307 F.3d at 781.
1- 21 C.F.R. § 10.25(b) (2012).
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determination of whether defendants' use of 'natural' was false or
misleading. 1
The court, therefore, dismissed without prejudice on the basis of
primary jurisdiction. 182
In several "natural" food labeling cases, courts have temporarily stayed
actions on the basis of the primary jurisdiction doctrine and have referred
the determination of whether the products at issue were "natural" to the
FDA."' However, when the FDA declined to address the issue, the stays
were lifted.184
Other courts have rejected the primary jurisdiction defense. Some have
reasoned abstention is inappropriate because the issue of whether food
labeling is deceptive "is not an issue of first impression, and does not
present an issue that requires the FDA's expertise."'s Others have reasoned
that, even if the primary jurisdiction doctrine does apply, it would be
pointless to refer the determination of the "natural" labeling issue to the
FDA. For example, in Janney v. General Mills, the court agreed with the
defendant that the issue of whether particular ingredients could be labeled
"natural" was one over which the FDA has primary jurisdiction. 8 6
Nevertheless, it declined to dismiss or stay the action because:
1' Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Porn
Wonderful L.L.C. v. Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2012)).
182 Astiana, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1017.
13 See Barnes v. Campbell Soup Co., No. C 12-05185 JSW, 2013 WL 5530017, at * 29-30
(N.D. Cal. July 25, 2013); Cox v. Gruma Corp., No. 12-CV-6502 YGR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
97207, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2013) (staying action for six months and referring to the FDA the
question of whether products containing GMOs can be labeled "natural"); Ries v. Hornell Brewing Co.,
No. 10-1139-JF (PVT), 2010 WL 2943860, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2010) (referring question of
whether high fructose corn syrup and citric acid are natural); Coyle v. Hornell Brewing Co., Civ. No.
08-2797 (JBS), 2010 WL 2539386, at *7 (D.N.J. June 15, 2010) (same).
" See generally Barnes, 2013 WL 5530017, at *31(explaining the six month time frame); see also
Cox, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97207, at *6 (same); Ries, 2010 WL 2943860, at *6; Coyle, 2010 WL
2539386, at *5.
185 Brazil v. Dole Food Co., 935 F. Supp. 2d 947, 960 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Jones v. Conagra
Foods, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 2d 889, 899 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Bates v. Kashi Co., No. 11-CV-1967-H
(BGS), slip op. at 10-11 (S.D. Cal. July 16, 2012); Briseno v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 154750, *28-29 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2011); Lockwood v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d
1028, 1034-35 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Wright v. Gen. Mills, Inc., Civ. No. 08-CV-1532-L (NLS), 2009
WL 3247148, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009); but ef Taradejna v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 2d
1128, 1134-35 (D. Minn. 2012) (dismissing without prejudice on primary jurisdiction grounds, finding
"[t]he FDA is in the best position to resolve any ambiguity about the standard of identity for yogurt-a
matter requiring scientific and nutritional expertise.").
s' Janney v. Gen. Mills, 944 F. Supp. 2d 806, 814 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
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In repeatedly declining to promulgate regulations governing the
use of "natural" as it applies to food products, the FDA has
signaled a relative lack of interest in devoting its limited resources
to what it evidently considers a minor issue, or in establishing
some "uniformity in administration" with regard to the use of
"natural" in food labels. Accordingly, any referral to the FDA
would likely prove futile. 87
Based on these decisions, primary jurisdiction does not appear to be a
promising defense.
E. Standing
1. Article IHf Standing
Under Article III of the US Constitution, a plaintiffs standing to
bring suit is a jurisdictional requirement of the federal courts. A motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction can challenge standing.188 To
establish standing,
A plaintiff must show (1) [he or she] has suffered an 'injury in
fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision. 89
In a class action, at least one of the named class representatives must
meet the standing requirements.190
"R7 Id. at *7; see also Bates, slip op. at 10-11 (stating the "plaintiffs are unlikely to achieve resolution
of their claims by petitioning the FDA due to the FDA's decision not to formally define 'natural,' the
FDA's lack of resources in regulating use of 'natural' on labels, and the lack of a private right of action
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.").
18 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
9 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC) Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000).
2" Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Defendants have successfully challenged Article III standing when the
named plaintiffs of a putative class assert consumer protection claims for
products they did not personally purchase.' 9' However, some courts have
held that the named plaintiffs need not have purchased all of the products
that are the subject of the complaint as long as the products they purchased
are sufficiently similar to others targeted in the case that they did not
purchase. For example, in Astiana v. Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc., the
court found sufficient similarity between the products the plaintiffs
purchased and others included in the complaint that they did not purchase
because they were the same kind of food product (ice cream) and the
defendant used the same labeling statements for all of the products."'
2. Statutory Standing
Some statutes providing private rights of action have their own
standing requirements. The standing requirements under California's UCL,
FAL, and CLRA are relatively lax. Under those statutes, a private plaintiff
must have "suffered injury in fact and [have] lost money or property as a
result of the unfair competition." Thus, the plaintiff must "plead and
prove an injury in fact-e.g., the loss of money or property-and 'actual
reliance' on the alleged fraudulent conduct."' 94 An injury is established if
the plaintiff can show he would not have purchased the product had it been
191 Compare Chin v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 0:12-CV-02150, 2013 WL 2420455, at *3 (D. Minn.
June 3, 2013) (citing Carrea v. Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc., No. C 10-01044 JSW, 2011 WL
159380, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 10, 2011)) (dismissing claims without prejudice as to products that the
named plaintiff did not purchase); and Lieberson v. Johnson &Johnson Consumer Co., 865 F. Supp. 2d
529, 537 (D.N.J. 2011) (dismissing allegations regarding products that Plaintiff did not purchase and
only considering allegations regarding products that Plaintiff alleges she purchased and used); with
Hemy v. Perdue Farms, Inc., Civ. No. 11-888 (FLW), 2011 WL 6002463, at *11 (D.N.J. Nov. 30,
2011) (dismissing claims with prejudice as to products that named plaintiff did not purchase).
192 Astiana v. Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc., Nos. C-11-2910 EMC, C-11-3164 EMC, 2012
WL 2990766, at *13 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2012), motion to certify appeal denied, Astiana v. Dreyer's Grand
Ice Cream, Inc., Nos. C-11-2910 EMC, C-11-3164 EMC, 2012 WL 4892391, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
12,2012).
193 CAL. BUS. &PROF. CODE § 17204 (2008); see also Ries v. Ariz. Beverages USA L.L.C., 287
F.R.D. 523, 529 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (explaining the test for standing under UCL, FAL, and CLRA is the
same).
194 Ries, 287 F.R.D. at 529 (quoting In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 39 (Cal. 2009)).
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labeled truthfully.19 s The plaintiff need not prove damages with certainty, 6
nor must he be entitled to restitution to have standing. 197
To establish the reliance element of standing, a plaintiff asserting a
cause of action under California's consumer protection statutes must have
evidence that, "in all reasonable probability," the plaintiff would not have
purchased the product had the defendant not made the misleading
statement.198 However, the alleged misrepresentation need not be the only
reason for plaintiffs decision to purchase or consume the product, nor "even
the predominant or decisive factor influencing his conduct."19 ' Moreover,
reliance is presumed whenever the misrepresentation was material-i.e.,
when "a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or
nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in
question."00 In Ries v. Arizona Beverages USA L.L. C., the court found that
"the representation that a beverage is 'All Natural' or '100% Natural' is
likely to be material."2 0' This decision shows that it is relatively easy to
satisfy the reliance element of standing in a California consumer protection
case challenging "natural" labeling.
F. Challenges to Class Certification
Named plaintiffs in "natural" labeling litigation face significant hurdles
in obtaining class certification. For practical purposes, defeating class
certification is often as effective in eviscerating the plaintiffs' case as
obtaining a dismissal or judgment on the merits. Thus, challenges to class
certification are crucial to the defense of food labeling litigation.
..s Jones v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 2d 889, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Degelmann
v. Advanced Med. Optics Inc., 659 F.3d 835, 840 (9th Cir. 2011)).
196 Ries, 287 F.RD. at 530 (finding sufficient proof of injury in fact where named plaintiffs'
evidence consisted only of sworn statements estimating the prices they paid for defendant's product).
197 Porn Wonderful L.L.C. v. Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing
Kwikset Corp. v. Super. Ct., 246 P.3d 877, 895 (Cal. 2011); Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 233 P.3d 1066,
1088 (Cal. 2010)).
1' See Ries, 287 F.R.D. at 529 (quoting In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d at 39) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
19 Ries, 287 F.R.D. at 529-30 (citing In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d at 39).
200 7d
21 Ries, 287 F.R.D. at 531.
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1. Rule 23 Requirements
Plaintiffs seeking class certification must meet all of the prerequisites
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) by showing that:
(1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable;
(2) There are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) The claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the.claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.202
Courts must undertake a "rigorous analysis" to determine that the
prongs of Rule 23(a) have been met.20 3 In addition, the plaintiffs in food
labeling class actions must establish, "through evidentiary proof, 204 that the
proposed class fits one of the pertinent types of class actions under Rule
23(b). Rule 23(b)(2) applies where "the party opposing the class has acted
or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting
the class as a whole."205 Alternatively, plaintiffs in food labeling cases may
seek certification as a Rule 23(b)(3) damages class. Such a class can be
certified only if "the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy."206 Plaintiffs must
establish all requirements for class certification by a preponderance of the
evidence. 207
202 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a).
203 Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982); Ries, 287 F.R.D. at 528 (citing
Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497,509 (9th Cir. 1992)).
20 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013).
205 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
206 id7
!207 In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 37-38 (2d Cir. 2006).
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2. Commonality/Predominance
One challenge for plaintiffs seeking class certification is sufficiently
establishing the existence of common issues. The commonality requirement
of Rule 23(a) is less demanding than the predominance requirement of
23(b)(3)." Commonality under Rule 23(a) requires "some questions of fact
and law which are common to the class," while predominance under Rule
23(b)(3) "questions of law or fact common to class members must
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members."20 ' To
meet the predominance requirement for a Rule 23(b)(3) damages class,
plaintiffs must show "that the issues in the class action that are subject to
generalized proof, and thus applicable to the class as a whole, predominate
over those issues that are subject only to individualized proof."21 0 The court
considers whether the class members could establish the elements of their
claims using common evidence.211
The Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp. case illustrates the difficulties for
plaintiffs to establish predominance of common issues sufficient to certify a
Rule 23(b)(3) damages class. 2 12 In that case, the court found that plaintiffs
could not prove essential elements of their claims with common evidence,
as opposed to individualized proof. For instance, the court found that the
plaintiffs failed to propose a reliable methodology for establishing injury
and causation necessary for their New York GBL § 349 claim-that class
members paid more for the product as a result of its "all natural" label-on
a class-wide basis. The plaintiffs had proffered an economics expert for that
purpose, but the court excluded his testimony as unreliable because he had
not identified what economic methodologies or data he would use, nor had
he built an algorithm for the court to review for reliability.213 Without
expert testimony to develop dass-wide evidence, proof of injury and
208 Ries, 287 F.R.D. at 536 (citing Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.
1998)).
209 Id.
210 Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742 (DLC), 2010 WL 3119452, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010) (quoting Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 483 (2d Cir. 2010)).
211 Weiner, 2010 WL 3119452, at *5 (citing In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280
F.3d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 2001)).
212 Weiner, 2010 WL 3119452, at *6.
213 Id. at *8.
"NATURAL" FOOD LABELING
causation "would require, among other things, an examination of each .of
the millions of class members' Snapple purchases, which the evidence shows
were made in different locations, at different times, and for different prices,
over the nearly eight-year class period."214
The Weiner court also found that the plaintiffs failed to show that they
could prove the elements of unjust enrichment and express warranty claims
with common evidence.215 For unjust enrichment, plaintiffs would need to
prove the amount of premium (i.e., the amount of the alleged unjust
enrichment) each class member paid and whether class members received
less than they bargained for.216 Such evidence would require individualized
evidence regarding what class members knew about high fructose corn
syrup and whether they believed it was natural. 217 For their breach of
express warranty claim, the plaintiffs would need to prove that the promise
of a natural product was a "basis of the bargain," which would require
individualized evidence about whether class members purchased in reliance
on the "natural" claim or for other reasons. 218 Given that all of these issues
require individual determinations, the court ruled that the plaintiffs had
failed to show that common issues were predominant.
Predominance has become even more difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy
since the Supreme Court's ruling in Comcast v. Behrend,21 which was
decided in 2013. In that case, the Court held that a plaintiff seeking to
certify a Rule 23(b)(3) damages class must put forth a damages model that
is capable of measuring damages across the entire class, "consistent with
[his or her] liability case" and that it "must measure only those damages
attributable to [the defendant's conduct]." 220 Applying Comcast, courts in
several "natural" labeling cases have found that he plaintiffs' proffered
damages models failed to identify the price premium attributable only to
214 Id. at *10.215 Id at*1.
216 Id. at *10-11.
217 Id at *1.
218 Weiner, 2010 WL 3119452, at *11,
219 Comcast v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
220 Id. at 1433-34.
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the "natural" claim, rather than other factors, such as value in the
defendant's brand.221
3. Typicality
Typicality of class representatives' claims also can be problematic for
plaintiffs seeking class certification. Courts have interpreted the typicality
requirement to mean that the class members' claims must "arise from the
same course of events, and each class member [must] make similar legal
arguments to prove the defendant's liability."22 2 Although a named plaintiff
may have some unique factual issues with regard to his or her claims, the
court should not certify a class "where a putative class representative is
subject to unique defenses which threaten to become the focus of the
litigation." 223 For example, where the state law that governs a class
representative's claims is different than that which applies to putative class
members, the claims are not typical. This was one of the problems for the
named plaintiff in Rapcinsky v. Skinnygirl Cocktails, L.L.C. The plaintiff
purchased a product in Massachusetts, and therefore, he could not assert
the New York GBL § 349 claim that was available to putative class
members who made their purchases in New York.224 The court in that case
also found that the named plaintiffs reasons for purchasing the product
were not typical of class members because he stated he would have bought
the product regardless of its price and that its naturalness was irrelevant to
his purchasing decision.22 5
22 Werdebaugh, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173789, *38-39; Brazil v. Dole Packaged Foods, LLC,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157575, *45 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6,2014); Jones v. Conagra Foods, Inc., No. C 12-
01633 CRB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81292, *76-77 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2014).
m Rapcinsky v. Skinnygirl Cocktails, L.L.C., No. 11 Civ. 6546 (JPO), 2013 WL 93636, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2013) (quoting Marisol v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir.1997)).
223 Rapcinsky, 2013 WL 93636 at *4 (quoting Baffa v. Donaldson, 222 F.3d 52, 59 (2d Cir.
2000)).
2 Rapcinsky, 2013 WL 93636 at *6.
" Id. at *8; see also Weiner, 2010 WL 3119452, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010) (explaining that
"Given New York's 'basis of the bargain' conception of reliance for express warranty claims, it is dear
that plaintiffs' purported reliance on Snapple's 'All Natural' label cannot be the subject of generalized
proof.").
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4. Manageability/Ascertainability
In addition, manageability and ascertainability of the proposed class
can also be a problem for plaintiffs seeking class certification. While not an
express requirement of Rule 23, the need to define a class includes an
"implied requirement of ascertainability."226 An ascertainable class is
"defined by objective criteria that are administratively feasible, and when
identifying its members would not require a mini-hearing on the merits."227
Furthermore, under Rule 23(b)(3), plaintiffs seeking certification of a
damages class have to show that the class action procedure is superior,
including consideration of the "difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action."228
In Weiner, the court found serious impediments to establishing that
the proposed class was manageable or ascertainable. 2 9 The plaintiffs sought
certification of a proposed class of potentially millions of persons worldwide
who purchased a Snapple beverage labeled "all natural" and containing high
fructose corn syrup in New York from October 10, 2001 to January 1,
2009.230 The plaintiffs failed to explain how such a class could be managed
or how class members could be ascertained given that they were unlikely to
have a receipt, bottle label, or any other documentation of their
purchases. 231
Even when plaintiffs have defined the class more narrowly than that
alleged in Weiner, some courts have struggled to find that the class members
would be ascertainaile without holding what would essentially constitute
mini-trials. In this regard, the Third Circuit's decision in Carrera v. Bayer
Corp., a case involving dietary supplement labeling, has influenced some
courts. 23 2 In Carerra, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to
establish ascertainability because there was no evidence that class members
226 Weiner, 2010 WL 3119452, at *12 (citing Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 471 F.3d 24, 30 (2d
Cir. 2006)).
227 Weiner, 2010 WL 3119452, at *12 (citing Charron v. Pinnacle Grp. N.Y. L.L.C., No. 07 Civ.
6316 (CM) (RLE), 269 F.R.D. 221, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
228 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
22 Weiner, 2010 WL 3119452, at *12.230 Id.
231 Id. at *12-13.
232 Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013).
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would have kept receipts of their purchases that they could be identified
from retailer records, or that affidavits of putative class members would be
reliable.2 33
Within the Ninth Circuit, district courts have split on the issue of
whether the inability to identify the members of a putative class of
purchasers makes the class unascertainable.234 Some have found
insurmountable problems with ascertaining the class members. 235 In others,
the courts held that class certification was appropriate-even without
having records to identify purchasers-because "[t]here is no requirement
that "the identity of the class members . . be known at the time of
certification."2 36
G. Plaintfifs' Failure of Proof
Very few "natural" labeling cases have reached decisions on the merits.
Three that have reached the summary judgment stage, however, resulted in
favorable rulings for the defense. In these three cases, summary judgment
was granted for the defendants due to the plaintiffs' failure to proffer
evidence essential to their claims.
In Weiner, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to present reliable
evidence that they paid a premium for the "All Natural" label on Snapple
containing HFCS.237 Rather, they had only vague recollections of the prices
they paid and the prices of alternative beverages available at the time.238
The plaintiffs also admitted that prices fluctuated and that Snapple may
have been cheaper than other options at certain times and places. 23 9 Based
on these facts, the court found that the plaintiffs had "not provided a
sufficient 'basis in fact' upon which a damages award could be based."240
In Ries v. Arizona Beverages, the court granted summary judgment for
2 Id. at 309-11.
2 See In re Conagra Foods, Inc., 302 F.R.D. 537, 565 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (noting the split).
2 See, e.g., Jones v. Conagra Foods, Inc., No. C 12-01633 CRB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81292,
*38 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2014)
' Astiana v. Kashi Co., 291 F.R.D. 493, 500 (S.D. Cal.2013) (quoting Ries, 287 F.R.D. at 536).
237 Weiner, 2010 WL 3119452, at *6.
138 Id. at *2-3.
239 Id.
240 Id. at *13.
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the defendants based on the plaintiffs' failure to adequately prosecute their
case.241 Initially, the court rejected the defendants' argument for summary
judgment, which was based on the plaintiffs' lack of evidence that they were
entitled to monetary relief.242 At that time, the court found that the
defendants' motion was premature because discovery was incomplete.243
After the close of discovery, however, the court granted defendants'
renewed motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiffs "offer not a
scintilla of evidence from which a finding of fact could determine the
amount of restitution or disgorgement to which plaintiffs might be entitled
if this case were to proceed to trial."244 Furthermore, because the plaintiffs'
counsel had been "dilatory and [had] failed to prosecute this action
adequately," the court decertified the class it previously certified so that its
decision to grant summary judgment would not have a preclusive effect on
the entire class.245
Most recently, in Brazil v. Dole Packaged Foods, LLC, the court found
that the plaintiff offered insufficient evidence to establish that Dole's "All
Natural Fruit" label on products containing ascorbic acid and citric acid
would mislead reasonable consumers.246 In that case, the only evidence that
consumers were likely to be deceived was the plaintiffs own testimony that
the label misled him. 247 The court found that evidence inadequate under
Ninth Circuit precedent holding that "a few isolated examples of actual
deception are insufficient. "248
V. CONCLUSION
The legal issues discussed in this paper surely will evolve as litigation
involving "natural" food labeling progresses through the courts. Trial
241 Ries v. Ariz. Beverages USA L.L.C., No. 10-01139 RS, 2013 WL 1287416, at *7-9 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 28,2013).
242 Ries, 287 F.R.D. at 531..
243 Id. at 532-33.
244 Ries, 2013 WL at *8.
245 Id. at *9.
2 Brazil v. Dole Packaged Foods, LLC, No. 12-CV-01831-LHK, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
169943, *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2014).
247 Id. at *20.248 Id.
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judgments and appellate decisions could significantly change the game. It
remains to be seen whether this particular type of lawsuit will have staying
power. For now, companies that may be hit with such litigation can prepare
by staying aware of developments in the cases and taking steps to minimize
the risks of being sued. Most importantly, food manufacturers should
evaluate their labeling and other marketing with the assistance of counsel
and consider removing "natural" or other hot-button terms, particularly
from higher-risk products containing synthetic or genetically engineered
ingredients and from products that have been made with more than
minimal processing.
